Global Imbalances: Focus China

Yasheng Huang, MIT Sloan School of Management and author of Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics wrote a very important article on the WSJ:

"Remember the hype about "decoupling"? Not so long ago, Western analysts -- in particular investment-bank economists -- were peddling the idea that China had become a powerful economic center of its own, able not only to drive its own growth independent of the United States but also to power the global economy forward.

To the extent that these Wall Street economists are still employed, few would make that argument now. The economic numbers emerging out of China are sobering. Exports, still the backbone of the economy, are contracting for the first time in seven years, according to the latest data. They're being driven down by slackening demand overseas. Even worse is the sharp decline of imports, a sure sign of falling domestic demand. These two developments taken together signal monumental economic challenges ahead. Clearly China is not bucking global trends.

So how did all the decoupling theorists get it so wrong? This isn't an idle question. The decoupling theory itself was the product of faulty economic analyses that persist today, even as the decoupling theory falls out of favor. Debunking these claims carries important policy implications.

The fundamental problem, and a mortal bias of economists, is a fixation with simple measurements -- especially GDP data. Ask a professional economist how many provinces China has and you are likely to draw a blank stare. But ask him what the GDP growth of China has been and he'll quickly be able to tell you that China has grown at a double-digit rate for 30 years and that at this rate China will overtake the U.S. by 2035 (or some other date). GDP-centrism is endemic, and often comes at the expense of deeper analysis. Just look at the enthusiasm with which economists and analysts greeted Goldman Sachs's famed "BRIC" report forecasting dramatic booms in Brazil, Russia, India and China -- a report based on little more than fifth-grade mathematics.

This obsession with China's impressive GDP growth often ignores discussion of what's causing that growth and whether it's self-sustained. This is where the decoupling enthusiasts stumbled, and where policy makers can still go seriously wrong. Consider, for example, data about the very slow growth of household incomes in China. This is particularly apparent in rural households. For the past 20 years or so, rural household income has grown at a rate half that of GDP growth. The slow household income growth, combined with rapid GDP growth, means that China has created a huge production capacity but it has done so at the expense of its own consumption base. This fact alone should have disproved the decoupling hypothesis. All the new "excess" production had to go somewhere, i.e., to the U.S. What's more, the persistence of this gap suggests that over time, China's growth has become more, not less, a derivative of America's consumption appetite.

This raises the important policy question of why and how Chinese growth systematically undermined its own consumption potential. To answer this, one has get a grip on how China's rapid GDP growth happened in the first place. Part of that growth is a result of economic liberalization, but the market-driven part is small and has been diminishing. Fixed asset investment, heavily controlled by the government, has risen to nearly 45% today, from a level of 30-35% during the 1980s. Much of the GDP growth since the mid-1990s has been a result of government-organized massive investment drives -- in infrastructure, urban construction and urbanization. This government-heavy growth has done the most damage to China's consumption potential, pushing the country further to a dependency on the markets of the rich nations.

Let me illustrate this point by an example. The following proposition will sound familiar to many foreign investors who have done business with Chinese local officials eager to get their investment capital: "Do you want 10 acres of densely populated land for your new factory? No problem. We will clear the land for you in three weeks." Many foreign investors marvel at the "business friendly" attitude of local governments in China, especially in sharp contrast to the seeming incompetence of the Indian government to get things done.

But this "business friendliness" is the heart of the problem: The Chinese households often reap almost no financial benefits from the conversion of their residential land into industrial or commercial development. The Chinese government, thanks to its formal ownership of all land assets, can relocate households on a scale unthinkable in a market economy, often with compensation far below the fair market value of the land. This is why factory owners incur far lower costs in setting up operations in China as compared with other countries, and also is why thousands of skyscrapers can mushroom seemingly out of nowhere overnight in Chinese cities.

But China is not exempt from a basic economic principle: A cost to one person is an income to another. The fact that factory owners and developers in China incur lower costs means that the income to some other economic participant is low. Those who derive low income in China happen to be the majority of the population, especially the rural Chinese who have little political power to protect themselves. Thus one sure mechanism of private wealth creation -- urbanization achieved when small landholders sell out to developers at market prices -- is almost completely missing in China despite the fact that the country is urbanizing at a dizzying rate on the surface.

All this is significant beyond the esoteric confines of the decoupling debate. To truly rebalance the Chinese economy requires the Chinese government to focus on income growth of the Chinese people rather than being fixated with GDP growth. One straightforward way to do this is to adopt market pricing of land by permitting and encouraging competition when acquiring land from Chinese peasants as a part of its current stimulus package. In the past two years, the Chinese leadership has done a good job reducing the expenditures -- such as taxes, education and health fees -- of the Chinese peasants. It is time now to raise their income.

China is one of the few countries in the world endowed with the land mass, the energetic and talented population, and the entrepreneurship to become a true global economic powerhouse. But that potential has been squandered by a misguided development strategy that privileges production at the expense of consumption and uses political power to suppress costs rather than relying on market mechanisms to boost income. In the midst of a global recession, China, along with its 1.3 billion people, is paying a dear price for that mistake now".



Now a much gloomier piece taken from a NakedCapitalism:

Yves Smith here: George Jankovic, serial entreprenuer (former president of NutriSystem) and quantitatively oriented investor, sent us a guest post that questions conventional wisdom about the growth prospects for China. Analysts have raised the specter that GDP growth would drop to 5%, which internally would be allegedly be tantamount to a recession (5% growth is necessary to absorb the increase in workforce). But just about no one seems to take seriously that China could have zero or negative growth.

From Jankovic:
Power generation in developing economies where manufacturing is a high % of GDP should correlate well with GDP growth. China's power generation declined more than 8% in November. In his FT.com Long Room posting, Joules Watt concludes that would correspond to a GDP growth of only 1.5% y-o-y based on his regression analysis of power generation vs. GDP growth. I think things will get even worse for China in 2009 and secular growth will never return to the levels we have gotten accustomed to during the last 30 years. The impact of these cyclical and secular slowdowns on a variety of products, such as oils and metals, will be huge.

Whether the official GDP data will confirm it or not, Chinese yoy real GDP growth will turn negative in the first half of 2009. Perhaps for all of 2009. This is the first time that China has been hit by both an external shock and an internal one. They are still blaming the US for their problems, but they were a co-participant in this bubble: their T-bill purchases fueled the credit bubble in the US which, in turn, fueled their export bubble. Everybody's credit bubbles fueled everybody's export bubbles, and vice versa, worldwide. So the Chinese export bubble has to collapse, as well. The same is true for their real-estate bubble (although this one was much smaller than US and UK bubbles).

Rare is an analyst willing to even contemplate low-digit growth rates for China in 2009, let alone NO GROWTH (Jim Walker from Asianomics (ex CLSA) predicts 0-4% growth). But, while history doesn't repeat itself, it rhymes. During its first 30 years of recovery and industrialization after WW2, Japan experienced several "growth recessions" when its growth halved from the boom times. But in the mid 1970s recession, it got much worse. Industrial production growth went from +16% y-o-y throughout the first half of 1973 to -19% in February 1975! Real y-o-y GDP growth went from more than 10% to solidly negative for a few quarters in late 1974 and early 1975.

While it's always dangerous to draw direct analogies from one country to another or from one time period to another, a country that is 25+ years into its industrialization, that is heavily dependant on both net exports to the world at the time of a global GDP and trade collapse, and that is also dependant on its real estate construction, has to get into deep trouble.

Can the rest of the fixed infrastructure investment help (infrastructure investment commands by far the highest % of GDP)? If you exclude investments in factories etc. (which will plunge with plunging exports) and home and office building construction (which are already plunging), what's left has already peaked. 2008 should have been the peak railroad construction year based on their 5-year plan. 2009 will, at best, match it if the Chinese government does move up some of the planned future construction. Road construction already peaked couple of years ago. The same is likely true for ports. Airports should have a brighter future, but only long-term. So, no help from this largest sector of the economy either.

I don't think there will be any help from consumer spending either. While the Chinese were not buying stocks in Shanghai on margin as the US investors did in 1929, they still lost a lot of money there. And since that was an epic bubble (based on cyclically-adjusted P/E ratios, it exceeded the Japanese bubble of 1989 and vastly exceeded the US 1929 and 2000 bubbles), it has still to deflate. What's more important is that wage growth in China didn't match its GDP growth over the years, so wages declined as a share of GDP. Consumption as % of GDP has roughly matched that fall.

As all kinds of businesses downsize now not only because of the recession, but also because of the new labor law, wages as % of GDP will further decline. Confidence has also been hit by multiple factors -- hey, all you need to do is read the papers (anywhere in the world, for that matter). These two factors will hurt consumption growth. You can already see this in declining car sales. Auto manufacturing was, along with its upstream industries like car parts, one of the strongest growing industries in China during the boom times.

So there will be no place to hide in 2009. But, that's not all...

Japanese growth never exceeded 10% after 1975. It never got even close to 10% while it routinely exceeded it prior to the mid 1970s. I believe that China will experience the same. It is not only much a more mature economy now, but the one that has already completed a good chunk of its industrialization and its exports are currently so high compared to the world GDP (much higher than Japan’s ever were) that one can't expect their super high growth to persist. Long-term demographics don't work in their favor either.

While this doesn’t mean that a great Chinese growth story ends, it will be a shock to many. For instance, while the current recession will hit hard the immediate Chinese demand for oil, metals and other commodities, the secular growth slowdown along with a more efficient energy and metals usage (they have just decided to raise taxes on oil, for instance, which will lead to more efficient usage over time) will hit the long-term demand, as well. Is the world ready to contemplate a much slower growing China? It better be.